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Abstract
The literature on financial regulation has typically emphasized the role of the powerful 
financial industry in shaping regulatory outcomes. However, capture theories cannot 
explain the prominence of financial consumer protection in post-crisis reform agen-
das. By contrast, this paper argues that, despite their collective action disadvantage, a 
polymorphous network of civil society organizations was able to gain momentum after 
the financial crisis and to influence the financial reform process. In this policy window, 
where decision-makers were looking out for an alternative source of expertise, a trans-
nationally connected civil society network successfully raised the issue of consumer 
protection on reform agendas in tandem with public entrepreneurs and on the back of 
a popular backlash against big finance. This argument will be explored through a com-
parative study of the impact of transnational pressures on policy-makers in Europe and 
the US in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. In the conclusion, the paper discusses 
the substance of the financial reforms that have been undertaken. 
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Transnational Civil Society and the Consumer-friendly  
Turn in Financial Regulation
Introduction
When it comes to the influence of non-state actors on international finance, scholarly 
attention has focused on the role the powerful financial industry has played in interna-
tional regulatory politics. Maintaining “symbiotic relations” with regulatory agencies, 
the financial industry has been able to influence the nature of financial governance and 
has the potential to capture regulatory processes (Helleiner/Zhang 2008: 541). Analy-
ses of the recent crisis have seemingly confirmed this conventional wisdom. According 
to many observers, national and international financial reform efforts after the crisis 
were considerably watered down or scaled back by transnational private-sector lobbies 
(Johnson/Kwak 2010; Engelen et al. 2010; Wolley/Ziegler 2011). However, this capture 
narrative misses an important aspect of current regulatory dynamics. By declaring con-
tinued private financial sector dominance in financial regulatory developments, these 
explanations cannot account for structural changes in the regulatory architecture in 
response to the crisis. In particular, scholars focusing solely on the role of the financial 
industry cannot explain why consumer protection has moved from the periphery to the 
center of political debates about reforms of the financial regulatory system in Europe 
and the United States in the aftermath of the most severe financial crisis since the Great 
Depression. How can we explain the reform outcome and the political processes that 
led to it? 
Consumer protection is one of the main domains treated in the “Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act” (short: Dodd-Frank) signed into law by President Obama 
on July 21, 2010. For the first time in the history of American finance, this legislation 
established a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as an independent federal 
agency to protect consumers from abusive financial practices. Similarly, under the ban-
ner of “restoring consumer confidence in financial markets,” the European Commission 
has brought forward a policy that includes legislative proposals on basic banking ser-
vices, stronger deposit guarantees and investor protection as well as on stricter regula-
tions of complex retail investment products and responsible lending. Among other is-
sues, consumer protection is also a remit of the new European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs). Leading financial service providers talk about a “clear shift in regulatory focus” 
from market efficiency toward transparency and investor protection (State Street 2011). 
Establishing a first international standard in the field of financial consumer protection, 
the G20 finance ministers and Central Bank governors endorsed “high-level principles” 
in October 2011. Moreover, civil society groups and other international organizations 
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launched various additional international initiatives, including the World Bank’s “Good 
Practices,” which complement the principles and give practical advice on ways to imple-
ment them (The World Bank 2012).
This consumer-friendly turn in the international financial reform agenda is somewhat 
surprising given that the strong and well-organized financial lobby has traditionally 
prevailed over weaker and less well-organized consumer organizations. Caught in a 
classic collective action dilemma (Olson 1965), consumer groups struggle to organize 
their members in order to influence politics. When we look at developments in finan-
cial regulation over the last decades, Olson’s reasoning has held true: concentrated costs 
and more political leverage for the tightly organized financial industry have generally 
led to more industry-friendly than consumer-friendly policies. People’s protests against 
deregulatory measures had little to no effect (Kroszner et al. 2011). 
And yet, dynamics are changing. With taxpayers’ money used for expensive bank bail-
outs, financial regulatory issues became politicized and attracted the public interest in 
a way that was most unusual for this highly technical and complex issue area. In a 
reaction to the subprime crisis in 2007, much public anger arose about the perceived 
unfairness of the international financial system – famously described as a system that 
privatized gains and socialized losses. “Occupy Wall Street” protests occurred in numer-
ous cities in the US and Europe, directed against financial elites held responsible for the 
devastating social consequences the financial meltdown had triggered. In an attempt 
to channel the outburst of public anger, numerous civil society organizations, such as 
consumer NGOs, unions and grass-roots groups started to build transnational alliances 
to influence the reform negotiations. Even though they were pitched against the fierce 
opposition of the financial industry, new coalitions “for financial reform” mushroomed.
This article argues that the transnational efforts of civil society groups account for the 
sudden popularity of consumer-friendly regulations on international financial reform 
agendas. Despite their collective action disadvantage, a polymorphous civil society net-
work was able to gain momentum in the aftermath of the crisis. In this policy win-
dow, where decision-makers were looking out for an alternative source of expertise, 
a transnationally connected civil society network successfully channeled widespread 
public support to call upon well-positioned public entrepreneurs and raise the issue 
of consumer protection. This argument will be explored through a comparative study 
of the impact of transnational pressures on policy-makers in Europe and the US in the 
immediate aftermath of the financial crisis. The article will focus on activities by which 
transnational non-governmental actors seek to influence the agenda-setting process 
rather than the ways in which they mobilize their members. The similarity of reform 
dynamics will be traced on the basis of policy documents, public statements and 24 
semi-structured interviews with representatives from civil society, international orga-
nizations and central banks in Brussels, Paris and Washington, DC, conducted in the 
summer of 2011 as well as the winter of 2012/2013.
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There is a growing consensus in the literature that internationally organized NGOs or 
non-profit transnational actors make a difference in world politics (Finnemore 1996; 
Batliwala/Brown 2006). Social scientific scholarship demonstrates, for example, that 
civil society groups acting across borders have had an impact on global policy decisions 
in the field of human rights, environmental protection and security policy as well as 
economic transactions, thereby underlining their status as major actors in international 
affairs (Keck/Sikkink 1998; Price 1998; Florini 2000). Yet, for all the scholarly atten-
tion paid to these transnational acting groups, the conditions under which civil society 
can impact financial regulation remain poorly understood. Friesen (2012: 3) notes that 
“although much has been written on both international finance and transnational so-
cial movements, little has been written on how these two bodies of literature might be 
connected.” This study addresses this gap by investigating the process by which trans-
national civil society seeks to influence international financial regulation in order to 
provide “more detailed knowledge of how the mobilization of these groups beyond the 
financial industry can influence the direction of state policy” (Helleiner/Pagliari 2011: 
179). Finally, if I can show that non-state actors are responding to challenges in interna-
tional finance, an issue area where their power appears to be relatively ineffective, then 
we can expect to find them playing a role in other sectors of the global economy as well.
I first outline potential answers to the question of financial regulatory change as sug-
gested by the literatures on organized interests, transnational expert networks and elec-
toral politics. I choose a different analytical lens that stresses the role of transnational 
civil society in channeling public attention and support for reform as main explanatory 
factor. Having sketched the empirical pattern of EU and US regulatory reform agendas, 
I focus on civil society groupings and their various strategies which aimed at raising 
the profile of financial consumer protection. I conclude the article by evaluating the 
contrasting results of the case studies. 
Explaining regulatory change in international finance 
Analyses about financial regulatory outcomes tend to emphasize private capture expla-
nations of policy-making. As I will demonstrate, however, these theories in the study of 
regulatory change have difficulty accounting for the consumer-friendly turn in finan-
cial reform agendas. After the financial crisis, policy-makers markedly stepped up their 
rhetoric on consumer protection in financial services. At the signing ceremony of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, President Obama (2010) called the reforms “the strongest consumer 
financial protections in history.” The European Commissioner for Internal Market and 
Services Michel Barnier (2010), called for “consumer protection across the board.” And 
the G20 leaders included a call to enhance consumer protection in their common dec-
laration of the Seoul Summit (G20 Declaration 2010). This rhetoric is all the more 
surprising, since past research has shown that private financial sector participation in 
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setting and implementing rules tends to put consumers at a disadvantage (Frangakis 
2009). I argue that focusing on the role of a civil society network helps us understand 
the post-crisis regulatory framework and in particular, the rise of consumer protection. 
Organized interests
One set of explanations for regulatory outcomes in a domestic politics tradition has 
focused on societal actors with a vested interest in financial regulatory affairs. Past lit-
erature has shown the increasing involvement of the private financial sector in national 
decision-making. Some scholars pinpoint the risk of capture due to the disproportion-
ate influence of the domestic private financial sector in shaping regulatory policies and 
its ability to fully internalize its preferences in the policy process (Hacker/Pierson 2010; 
Johnson/Kwak 2010). As a result, regulatory outcomes traditionally favored “the narrow 
‘few’ at the expense of society as a whole” (Mattli/Woods 2009), and bodies governing 
international finance have become “instruments of private economic interests rather 
than of the public good” (Underhill/Zhang 2003: 86). Accordingly, Hacker and Pierson 
(2010) explain striking income inequalities among Americans in terms of the organi-
zational capacity of resourceful private interests to bring public policy in line with their 
interests. This pattern has been most pronounced in the field of finance, they argue, 
where the massive political leverage of financial industry lobbyists accounts for overly 
industry-friendly regulatory politics. Frangakis (2009: 102) draws a similar picture re-
garding European financial services policy, which is “heavily oriented towards serving 
the interest of … the financial industry.”
From this perspective, where regulatory change depends upon the means and the power 
of the financial industry lobby to (re-)shape regulatory reform, we would expect the 
outcome to reflect domestic financial sector preferences. Instead, in the wake of the 
crisis, various scholars have stressed the industry’s relative resilience to reform (John-
son/Kwak 2010; Engelen et al. 2011). While the banking industry stated that it sup-
ports “regulatory reform to improve consumer protection” (Yingling 2009), industry 
lobbyists were particularly opposed to the creation of a US consumer protection bureau. 
Similarly, in the EU, financial industry lobbyists tried to defend the status quo rather 
than push for reform. Hence, for our case studies, the organized interests’ perspective 
falls somewhat short of explaining sudden change. 
Transnational networks of experts
Drawing on the “epistemic communities” literature, scholars have sought to explain 
regulatory change in terms of transnational or transgovernmental networks of experts 
(Baker 2009; Haas 1992; Mosley 2009). Contrary to organized interest explanations, ap-
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proaches in this tradition stress the political influence of the financial epistemic com-
munities that hold highly specialized knowledge. Past literature has shown that govern-
ments are largely dependent on the expertise of self-regulatory international bodies, 
such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basle Committee, whose member-
ship consists largely of private industry associations (Underhill/Zhang 2010). In a simi-
lar vein, Tsingou (2010) describes how the private sector has been actively influencing 
financial policy-making through a “coherent transnational policy community.” This 
explanation highlights the transnational nature of informal governance networks such 
as the “Group of 30,” whose membership blurs the public-private distinction by includ-
ing supervisors, regulators and representatives of business associations. She argues that 
“the financial industry is now organized … in a way that is qualitatively different from 
interest groups” (Tsingou 2010: 23). Indeed, financial governance today relies on a com-
bination of rule-setting and implementing by both the private and the public sectors 
(Mosley 2009). 
Yet, if the transnational community of financial experts caused the shift towards con-
sumer protection, one would expect to see a degree of consensus among the financial 
elite on a set of reform provisions, “for without a clear mission and rationale experts are 
unlikely to influence policy” (Finnemore 1996: 99). However, the global financial and 
economic crisis called the expertise of the existing financial epistemic community and 
their past consensus on light-touch regulation into question. In the aftermath of the 
crisis, the financial community was divided over the desirability of reform. Divisions 
emerged among politicians, regulators and industry representatives as well as between 
parts of the private financial sector, thereby reducing the sector’s post-crisis political 
influence (Helleiner/Pagliari 2011; Engelen 2011). After the damage the financial crisis 
had done to the economy and linkages between the financial industry and the political 
system became publicly denunciated, this transnational community of experts partly 
lost its political leverage. 
Electoral politics
Another plausible hypothesis would hold that electoral contingencies and public opin-
ion are a causal factor influencing decision-makers. This explanation is clearly percep-
tible for several of the Dodd-Frank measures, such as a tougher derivative regulation 
due to Senator Blanche Lincoln’s position in response to an electoral challenge or the 
dilution of the “Volcker Rule” wording after the election of Republican Scott Brown 
(Woolley/Ziegler 2011). Polling data gives us clues to about why the topic was very 
popular with decision-makers in general, with 57 percent of those polled supporting 
the creation of a new federal agency to protect consumers (Limbach 2009). It should 
have been clear to decision-makers that there was very little appetite among voters for a 
soft line on the industry. Hence, in the US case, electoral politics cannot be denied as a 
factor in the increased focus on consumer issues in financial reforms. In Europe, how-
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ever, electoral contingencies cannot account for why the technocrats of the European 
Commission put the issue at the forefront of their reform proposals. After all, 85 per-
cent of Europeans reported that they have never had a problem with a financial product 
or service (Eurobarometer 2012). 
An alternative explanation: A civil society perspective
Given the public outcry and emerging popular pressures in response to the latest finan-
cial crisis, recent efforts on the part of scholars to explain regulatory changes pay strik-
ingly limited attention to the role of civil society actors such as transnational consumer 
associations, trade unions and grass-roots organizations. Woolley and Ziegler (2011: 4) 
argue that the Dodd-Frank Act is the result of a “creative brokering of elites and grass 
roots interests.” While elected officials in Washington tried to cultivate friendly relations 
with Wall Street, they also tried to appeal to popular activists. Indeed, the involvement of 
these societal actors in the financial reform debate was one of the most striking aspects of 
the crisis. Despite the growing consensus in the literature that transnational actors play 
an active part in world politics (Josseline/Wallace 2001), research examining the links 
between these emerging actors and global finance in particular is relatively young. In the 
field of global economic policy, civil society activism has been described as “economic 
justice movements” or “anti-globalization movements” (Clark 2006: 180). O’Brien et al. 
(2000), for example, found increased engagement on the part of civil society in multi-
lateral economic institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. These developments 
marked a shift away from the state-focused “international relations” theory to the study 
of the “global society,” which recognizes the increased role of non-state actors in global 
policy (Barnett/Sikkink 2008). Accordingly, scholars started to pay more attention to 
civil society as alternative source for regulation and an increasingly important actor in 
standard-setting processes of regulation, especially in the EU (Dunkerley/Fudge 2004). 
Some scholars have recognized the various social responses to financial crises, identify-
ing civil society as an emerging actor in financial regulatory policies in Europe and the 
US (Helleiner/Pagliari 2011; Friesen 2012; Woolley/Ziegler 2011). Scholte and Schnabel 
(2002) attribute an active role to civil society, but limited impact in shaping regulatory 
outcomes. Non-state actors’ impact on financial regulation has yet to be explored in 
more detail. This analysis will therefore try to shed light on the following questions: 
how can we explain the sudden popularity of consumer protection on financial reform 
agendas on both sides of the Atlantic in response to the latest financial and economic 
crisis? Did civil society provoke real policy change, and if so, how?
In order to understand regulatory change, this paper adopts the analytical framework 
proposed by Keck and Sikkink (1998) in their analysis of conditions under which trans-
national networks can stimulate change. In doing so, I trace the appearance of consum-
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er protection back to activism by a civil society network,1 which encompasses the range 
of transnational non-state actors who are committed to reforming financial regulation 
in the interest of the broader public – that is, in the interest of consumers of financial 
services. Such civil society groups include a wide range of organizations, from con-
sumer associations, think tanks and policy research institutes to trade unions, business 
associations and other NGOs.
 Illustrating the critical role of “demonstration effects” as triggers of regulatory reforms, 
this article underlines the cataclysmic effects of the crisis, which demonstrated to a wid-
er public the social costs associated with light-touch regulation (Mattli/Woods 2009). 
In the empirical section, I will demonstrate that by exploiting this widespread public 
and media attention and strong pro-reform citizen base, NGOs, consumer associations 
and trade unions established transnational networks among themselves as well as with 
important public entrepreneurs fostering their ideas (“leverage politics”). NGOs and 
consumer groups engaged in “direct lobbying” in order to influence the agenda-setting 
process – which was successful because civil society groups not only “framed” the re-
form debate in a way that connected with the wider public and decision-makers alike 
(“symbolic politics”) but also gathered politically usable information (“information 
politics”). Finally, through a variation of “boomerang politics,” activists were able to 
generate additional effective political pressure on states through other channels, such 
as international organizations whose decisions would echo back into national politics 
(Friesen 2012). As we will see in the case studies, a combination of these strategies proved 
to be particularly effective in bringing about a consumer-friendly turn in finance.
Empirical observations: The emergence of financial consumer protection
In Europe and the US alike, policy-makers reacted to the crisis and recognized the im-
portance of financial consumer protection (see Table 1 for a detailed comparison). I will 
consider the two cases in turn in order to explain what accounts for this convergence. 
Due to their market power, both are central actors in financial market regulations with 
consequences for the rest of the world. Comparing the two cases with a common out-
come and very different political structures will allow us to identify the dynamics of 
civil society activism as a common factor that can explain the consumer-friendly turn. 
1 Although some organizations refer to a “consumer movement” to describe their actions to in-
fluence financial reforms, I prefer the term “network,” since the emphasis here is not on the 
mobilization of a broader public (as with movements) but on the way civil society became or-
ganized to bring about policy change. I use the term transnational to highlight the cross-border 
linkages among the groups involved.
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The US case
The US administration set an ambitious post-crisis reform program in motion. For 
the first time, Dodd-Frank created an independent Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau – a new regulatory agency, housed in the Federal Reserve, with the sole responsibil-
ity of protecting consumers of financial products. In charging one single agency with 
consumer protection responsibilities, the reform succeeded in replacing a patchwork of 
seven different agencies, thereby consolidating and strengthening the regulation of con-
sumer financial products. The new bureau also hosts a national consumer complaint 
hotline as well as a new Office of Financial Education to promote financial literacy. 
Most importantly, the CFPB conducts rule-making, supervision and enforcement for 
federal consumer financial protection laws; it monitors financial markets and can en-
force laws that outlaw discrimination and other unfair treatment in consumer finance.2 
Consumer groups have widely acknowledged the CFPB as a powerful new regulator: “It 
is the first federal regulator that not only has the ability to write rules for non-banks, 
but it also has the ability to supervise and examine non-banks. That’s a power that has 
never accrued to any federal bureau before,” summarizes a consumer representative.3 
At its inauguration, civil society celebrated the new bureau as “a huge victory for the 
consumer movement.”4 Addressing the financial industry, a consumer advocate noted 
effusively: “They lost. We won.” (Mierzwinski 2010: 596).
The initial idea for a consumer protection agency had come from Harvard law professor 
and consumer advocate Elisabeth Warren, who had published articles in 2007 and 2008 
arguing in favor of a Financial Product Safety Commission responsible for consumer 
credit products as a single regulator. In March 2009, two years after Warren’s first article 
was published and in the midst of the turmoil caused by the financial crisis, two Con-
gressmen picked up the idea and formally introduced it into Congress. The President 
himself as well as Treasury Secretary Michael Barr became advocates of the idea, and 
later that year, in June 2009, the Treasury included the proposal of a new agency in its 
White Paper “Financial regulatory reform: A new foundation,” which served as a blue-
print for financial reform. Warren’s proposal enjoyed widespread public support, as her 
election as United States senator from Massachusetts in November 2012 confirmed. She 
was also the candidate of choice as head of the new agency of a group called “Americans 
for Financial Reform”, a coalition of 200 consumer, housing and labor groups, which 
made passing the CFPB its top legislative priority. 
The fact that the CFPB came into being was a “remarkable event” (Woolley/Ziegler 
2011) given the strong opposition from industry groups, who reportedly increased their 
lobbying efforts. According to the Center for Responsive Politics (2010), industry mobi-
2 For more information on the CFPB and its core functions, see:  
<www.consumerfinance. gov/the-bureau/>.
3 Interview with a representative of a consumer association, Washington, DC (August 2011).
4 Interview with a representative of a consumer organization (July 2011).
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lized and spent $224.6 million on lobbying in 2009, more than any other sector (except 
for the health sector which spent $263.6 million during the same time period). Argu-
ably, the new consumer bureau attracted more hostility from industry groups than any 
other reform proposal. In September 2009, right after Senator Dodd had introduced a 
version of the bill in the House in July, a group of 25 business associations, including 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Financial Services Roundtable and the Business 
Roundtable, sent a letter to members of the House opposing the new regulator. “The 
drastic powers granted to a new agency … will impose severe unintended consequenc-
es on businesses and consumers alike,” the groups wrote (US Chamber of Commerce 
2009). In a testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, the president of the 
American Bankers Association said that the CFPB would undermine innovation and 
limit consumer choice, as well complicating existing regulatory structures. “Simply put, 
this would appear to be the most powerful agency ever created in that it has almost 
unlimited power to regulate and even mandate the products offered by the regulated,” 
(Yingling 2009: 11). 
The US Chamber of Commerce even set up a “stoptheCFPA.com” website which could 
be used for online activism against the new bureau. Professor Warren herself said that 
industry’s aim was to “to stick a knife in the ribs” of the new bureau (Interview with Jon 
Stewart 2011). As a result, several consumer protection provisions did not make it into 
the final bill or were “significantly watered down” (Carpenter 2010: 828). For instance, a 
provision for consumer-friendly financial products (so-called “plain vanilla” products), 
favored among consumer groups, was completely eliminated. Auto dealers are also ex-
empted from oversight by the CFPB, another example of how a consumer-friendly pro-
posal did not make it into the Dodd-Frank Act, despite lobbying of the AFR coalition 
which had actively tried to block the exemption of auto dealers from CFPB oversight. 
Most of all, even though civil society had thrown all its weight behind Elisabeth Warren 
to become head of the new agency, President Obama eventually nominated Richard 
Cordray as the first director of the bureau, following strong Republican and indus-
try opposition to Warren’s appointment. To sum up, consumer protection remained a 
prominent feature of the reform bill, but after fierce opposition by business organiza-
tions, individual measures were severely watered down.
The EU case
Similar to the US reaction to the crisis, the European Union (EU) agreed on a series of 
reform proposals that significantly altered the regulatory architecture of European fi-
nancial regulation and deepened the single market in financial services. Although there 
is no overarching initiative in the EU that would be comparable to the Dodd-Frank Act, 
the Commission brought forward several legislative proposals, some of which, at the 
time of writing, are being discussed in the European Parliament (EP) and the Council. 
In October 2008, as a first step in response to the financial crisis, Commission Presi-
dent Barroso appointed a high level group of financial services experts to lay out the 
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foundations for reform of the European financial system architecture. The Larosière 
Report, issued in February 2009, was the first EU-level document that gave a compre-
hensive account of required structural changes. Based on that report, the EP – following 
agreement by all the member states – voted through a new supervisory framework for 
financial regulation in the EU on September 22, 2010; it came into force in January 2011. 
Within the new framework, consumer protection falls within the jurisdiction of the 
three new ESAs that work in tandem with the existing national supervisory authorities. 
Although there is no equivalent to the American CFPB on the European level, the ESAs 
have a mandate to protect consumers against abusive practices, with stakeholder groups 
representing consumer associations in all three organizations. The European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA), for instance, issues reports on consumer trends as well 
as warnings, and it monitors new financial activities as well as the development of com-
mon rules on information transparency.5
After the financial crisis, the European Commission markedly stepped up its rhetoric on 
increasing consumer protection in retail financial services. Commissioner Barnier be-
came a strong entrepreneur in favor of enhanced consumer protection, and he empha-
sized this point with respect to the new authorities when he asserted: “These measures 
will enhance consumer protection. And they will contribute to ensuring the taxpayer is 
not again the first in line to bear the costs of a crisis” (Barnier 2011). In addition to this 
institutional change, Commissioner Barnier has been promoting an extensive legisla-
tive agenda with financial reform documents issued by the Commission putting strong 
emphasis on consumer protection. Under the headline of “A more consumer-friendly 
financial system,” the Directorate General for Internal Market and Services (2010) listed 
several provisions for enhancing consumer welfare through a standardized informa-
tion sheet (“ESIS”) to compare mortgage conditions from different providers, granting 
access to basic bank accounts and better investor protection. Highlighting benefits for 
consumers, a press release by the Commission called the reform provisions a “package 
to boost consumer protection and confidence in financial services” (EC 2010a). In June 
2010, a famous EC Communication (2010b: 7) called “Regulating financial services for 
sustainable growth” stated that “the regulatory framework must ... make sure that the 
financial services sector works for the benefit of citizens and the real economy.” Finally, 
in its Financial Reform Progress Report in February 2011, the Commission reinforced 
this statement and underlined that “restoring the confidence of consumers in the finan-
cial sector and the single market – and making sure this confidence is based on strong 
and sound foundations – is an essential element” of reforms (EC 2011: 7). 
As in the American case, the regulatory changes attracted pressure from business groups 
against certain reform proposals. The EP and the Committee on Economic and Mon-
etary Affairs reportedly faced “extremely vigorous” lobbying pressure from financial 
service-sector lobbyists (Hoedeman 2009). Talking about the political influence of the 
financial industry through lobbying power in the EU, a representative of a Brussels-
5 Lecture by Verena Ross, Executive Director of ESMA, Sciences Po, Paris (November 2012).
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based NGO stated that everything was “back to business as usual.” And when asked 
about the improvements brought about by the EU financial reforms, another NGO 
representative remarked that he was rather pessimistic about the reforms’ long-term 
benefits for consumers.6 Moreover, NGOs denounced the new ESAs for placing too 
little importance on consumer protection in their mandate as well as for their mem-
ber composition, which favors a strong presence of big banks.7 On the issue of the 
European standardized information sheet, one NGO representative complained that 
the Commission consulted only four consumer organizations but 20 business organi-
zations: “It is about pleasing the business and keeping NGOs quiet.”8 Hence, while the 
Commission’s rhetoric left little doubt about the importance of making the financial 
system more consumer-friendly, consumer representatives remained skeptical about 
reform process as well as substance. 
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
Table 1 Consumer-friendly regulation post-crisis: A cross-Atlantic comparison
European Commission proposals US Dodd-Frank Act
Investor 
compensation
Commission proposal to amend Directive 
97/9/EC on investor-compensation schemes 
(12 July 2010) to ensure a minimum of 
50,000 euros protection for investors in 
investment products. 
The Act provides new rules for 
transparency and accountability for 
credit rating agencies to protect 
investors and businesses.
Deposit 
guarantees
Commission proposal for a revision of the 
Directive on deposit guarantee schemes 
(12 July 2010) to further harmonize and 
simplify the protection of deposits and 
ensure faster payouts. 
The Act permanently increases 
deposit insurance for banks, thrifts 
and credit unions to 250,000 dollars.
Mortgage
lending
Commission proposal for a Directive on 
credit agreements relating to residential 
property (31 March 2011) to improve 
the way in which mortgages are sold 
to consumers, provided through an 
information sheet allowing consumers to 
compare mortgage conditions. 
In January 2013, the CFPB laid out 
new mortgage rules under which 
banks and other lenders will be 
prohibited from making home loans 
that offer deceptive teaser rates 
or require no documentation from 
borrowers.
Financial inclusion EU adopts Commission Recommendation on 
access to a basic payment account (18 July 
2011) to give every European citizen access 
to a basic account with electronic payment 
instruments.
The Act authorizes CFPB to improve 
access to mainstream financial 
institutions and provide alternatives 
to payday loans.
Retail investment 
roducts (PRIPs)
Commission proposal for a regulation 
on a new Key Information Document for 
investment products (3 July 2012) concerning 
risky retail investment products.
No equivalent.
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The international level
While financial regulatory policy is usually negotiated by regulators and private actors, 
the G20 has become a major player in financial reform debates and hence a crucial tar-
get for civil society campaigns. Consumers International (CI), the world federation of 
consumer groups, mobilized its 240 members to lobby the G20 meetings for example 
in the run-up to the Seoul Summit in November 2010,  in close cooperation with the 
biggest European and American consumer associations.
European Consumers’ Organisation (BEUC), the US Consumers Union (CU) and CI 
launched the “Consumers for Fair Financial Services” campaign, calling for the G20 
to take urgent action to support financial consumer protection and develop new in-
ternational guidelines. At the time, the campaign group had already been working on 
concrete propositions that were later released as “recommendations for the G20 on the 
enhancement of consumer protection in financial services,” including a call for inter-
national standards and guidelines as well as development of an international organiza-
tion to share best practices and support the development of standards and guidelines.9 
Following the CI campaign, and in response to a call by the G20 in February 2011, an 
OECD-led Task Force produced “High-level Principles on Financial Consumer Protec-
tion,” which the G20 finance ministers endorsed in October of the same year. The final 
document calls on all G20 members to “assess their national frameworks for financial 
consumer protection in the light of these principles and promote international co-op-
eration to support the strengthening of financial consumer protection in line with, and 
building upon, the principles” (OECD 2011). For the first time, decision-makers agreed 
on international (non-binding) standards to enhance financial consumer protection 
across all financial service sectors.
To sum up, two observations are worth underlining. First, despite intense lobbying ef-
forts by the financial industry, consumer protection became a key domain of the in-
ternational regulatory overhauls. Neither in Europe nor in the US was the financial 
industry successful in terms of blocking a more consumer-friendly re-regulation of in-
ternational finance. On the contrary, the creation of a watchdog for consumer financial 
products was a clear defeat for industry groups such as the American Bankers Associa-
tion. Neither of the industry groups had supported cross-sectorial international prin-
ciples on financial consumer protection. These observations run counter to the capture 
narratives. Second, while the initial reform agenda on both sides of the Atlantic seemed 
to mark a clear consumer-friendly turn in financial services, the subsequent reform and 
implementation process was not nearly as pronounced as pro-change advocates had 
wished for. How can we explain the political processes that led to the initial ambitious 
reform agenda on consumer financial protection as well as its subsequent dilution dur-
ing implementation?  
9 Interview with a representative of a consumer association (August 2011).
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The transnational civil society network
The subprime crisis also turned out to be a major catalyst for the formation of a broad 
inter-regional alliance among consumer associations, trade unions, NGOs and anti-
globali zation activists, allowing civil society to strengthen its capacity to influence the 
policy process. Groups that had never been involved in finance before reported that 
they started their work on financial issues after the crisis. Others stepped up their ac-
tivities and built new coalitions that had not existed prior to the crisis.10 While hun-
dreds of groups have been engaged, the main focus here will be on the most visible 
umbrella organizations in the reform debates. Table 2 tries to capture the most relevant 
organizations.
A new alliance of more than 250 civil society organizations, named “Americans for Fi-
nancial Reform” was announced in May 2009, at about the same time the US admin-
istration brought forward its reform proposals. The formation of such an alliance in 
the financial services sector, representing “a cohesive non-industry voice,” was a unique 
event in American history (Woolley/Ziegler 2011: 23). Cohen (2010) goes so far as to 
call it the “fourth wave of consumer activism” in the US. Modeling themselves after the 
American initiative, the coalition “Europeans for Financial Reform” (EFFR) was cre-
ated in September 2009 by 23 different groups representing several hundred European 
organizations, ranging from development NGOs and trade unions to the European 
socialist party. A number of meetings among members of the two pro-reform groups 
took place in Washington, DC, New York and Brussels between 2009 and 2010,11 allow-
ing the groups to build a transatlantic alliance. The groups created the new position of 
a “Project Officer for Financial Reform” in Brussels to coordinate the campaign.12 Both 
campaign groups were part of a rapidly expanding transnational network of organiza-
tions and individuals that became actively involved in the reform debate. 
Following Keck and Sikkink (1998), this section will illustrate various tactics used by 
civil society groups to demonstrate their impact on regulatory reform. It will explore 
how civil society formed transnational networks, called upon and lobbied powerful 
political allies, reframed the issues, transformed the discourse and shifted the agenda of 
financial reforms. 
10 Interviews with representatives of NGOs in Brussels (May, June, July and August 2011).
11 Ibid.
12 Interview with a representative of an NGO, Brussels (June 2011).
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Leverage politics and public entrepreneurs
Keck and Sikkink (1998) proposed the concept of “leverage politics” to describe the 
capacity of civil society groups to call upon far more powerful allies, so-called “target 
actors” who can influence policy-making directly. Annual meetings of the Transatlantic 
Consumer Dialogue (TACD), for example, were an important forum for information 
Table 2 Civil society engaged in reforming consumer financial protection 2008–2013
Name Founded Members Countries Type of organization
International/transatlantic
CI 1960 220 consumer 
organizations
115 International federation of consumer 
organizations 
TACD 1998 77 EU/US consumer 
organizations
≈ 22 Forum of EU/US consumer 
organizations 
European Union
ALTER-EU ≈ 160 organizations 
ranging from NGOs to 
trade unions
Coalition of public interest  
groups and trade unions
BEUC 1962 44 independent consumer 
organizations
31 Independent nonprofit EU consumer 
organization 
EFFR 2009 18 organizations ranging 
from NGOs to trade 
unions
≈ 36 Coalition to campaign for financial 
reform
ETUC 1973 83 trade unions 36 Independent nonprofit EU consumer 
organization
Euroinvestors 2009 – ≈ 10 European federation of  
investors and other end users
FIN-USE 2004 15 expert groups on users 
of financial services
15 Independent expert forum including 
academics, small business experts, 
consumer groups
Solidar 1948 56 member organizations 25 European network of NGOs
United States
AFR 2009 250 organizations 
ranging from consumer 
NGOs to small businesses 
US Coalition to campaign for financial 
reform
CFA 1968 300 non-profit 
organizations
US Association of non-profit consumer 
organizations to advance the 
consumer interest 
CU 1936 8 million subscriptions to 
newsletters
US Independent, non-profit 
organization
NACA – 1,500 attorneys US Non-profit association of attorneys 
and consumer advocates
NCL 1899 – US Consumer organization
PC 1971 80,000 members US Consumer rights group, non-profit 
organization
US PIRG 1970 26 state PIRGS US Federation of state public interest 
research groups
Source: Assembled by the author
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sharing. One representative remarked: “At these meetings high level political represen-
tatives are present, [Commissioner] Barnier for example. So it is an opportunity to put 
forward common recommendations and build a momentum.”13 Another important 
stakeholder meeting was the Financial Forum in Ljubljana in May 2010. Consumer 
groups interpreted the Conference as “a milestone to raise the issue of consumer pro-
tection on the political level, to make the link between work at the national level and at 
the international front,” as one NGO member put it.14 Also, campaigns organized after 
the meeting drew heavily on the common principles laid down in Ljubljana. Hence, 
these conferences served networking purposes in two respects: first, civil society could 
use them as a platform to find common ground in order to speak with a cohesive voice. 
Second, the groups could use the forums to convince “target actors” of their agendas.
Soon after the crisis, and in contrast to the US case, civil society in Europe found a pow-
erful political ally in the European Parliament (EP). Contrary to AFR, which was a coali-
tion made up exclusively of civil society groups, the Party of European Socialists (PES) 
and the Greens organized the EFFR campaign in tandem with trade unions and NGOs. 
Moreover, in an effort to create an environment favorable to civil society input, MEP 
Pascal Canfin (Green Party) initiated the creation of an NGO named “Finance-Watch” 
in 2009 as a counter-lobby to the financial industry. Not least, the new NGO serves as an 
example of MEPs as public entrepreneurs who have built a strong pro-reform alliance 
with civil society. Not only MEPs but also the Commission became more receptive to 
demands for better consumer protection after the financial crisis and with the change in 
leadership at the Commission DG, from McGreevy to Barnier.  “It made it as different 
as day and night,” said a consumer representative.15
On both sides of the Atlantic, well-positioned allies played a central role. In the US, the 
AFR coalition found a strong political ally in Harvard law professor Elizabeth Warren. 
In her position as Special Advisor to the Treasury at the CFPB, she was an important 
public entrepreneur on the political stage who defended the new consumer agency in 
congressional hearings and various sub-committee meetings of the House of Repre-
sentatives.16 The Obama administration itself became a strong advocate of consumer 
protection in the reform process. In his Wall Street speech in April 2010, the President 
made clear that he regarded consumer protection as an essential element of the finan-
cial reform, thereby risking “increasingly fractious relations” with the financial industry 
(Cooper 2010). Had it not been for this support from powerful entrepreneurs receptive 
to civil society demands, consumer protection would most likely not have seen the light 
13 Interview with a representative of a consumer association, Paris (July 2011).
14 Ibid.
15 Interview with a representative of an NGO, Brussels (June 2011).
16 Warren gave testimony about the CFPB to Congress in May 2011 and to the House Financial 
Services Coommittee in June 2009 and in March 2011.
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of day. Or, as a representative of an NGO put it, “because the President and Elizabeth 
Warren are providing Washington with the moral leadership it often lacks, do we have a 
chance to enact meaningful Wall Street reform” (Mierzwinski 2010: 585). 
However, why did public entrepreneurs listen this time to civil society calls that had 
been issued long before the crisis? In the following section, I argue that this was due 
to fierce lobbying efforts combined with the use of a dominant rhetoric that resonated 
well with the wider public and decision-makers in the aftermath of the crisis. 
Direct lobbying
Civil society promoted the issue of consumer protection early on in the reform process 
and sought to impact the political agenda through direct lobbying to influence power-
ful actors. In the US, civil society picked up Warren’s idea and put its weight behind it. 
One of the first actions was the release of a joint statement by the leaders of seven of the 
country’s leading public-interest groups in December 2008, giving clear instructions for 
the reinstatement of an Office of Consumer Affairs in the White House, about one year 
before the idea was formally introduced into Congress (CU 2008). The reform agenda 
was then sent to President-elect Barack Obama and strongly supported in testimony 
before the US House of Representatives in July 2009. The call was also joined by the 
AFR coalition (2009). A consumer representative notes, “The Obama administration 
was receptive to our demands. It started with the new credit card reform. The admin-
istration was more receptive due to what had happened. They received many, many 
complaints.”17 
Most European civil society groups also stepped up their lobbying efforts after the 
Larosière High Level Group published its report in February 2009, which they criticized 
for a lack of focus on consumer protection. In various letters to Commission President 
Barroso, FIN-USE (2009b) denounced a “lack of direct public interest representation.” 
BEUC (2009) also put pressure on the Commission, saying that the communication on 
“European Financial Supervision” was leaving out the conduct-of-business side. The 
EFFR (2009b) coalition joined these calls, saying that the EU needed “a financial system 
at the service of people’s interests.” The groups continued to draw up several drafts 
and published position papers as well as responses to Commission consultations. A 
closer look at the Commission’s roadmap to enhance consumer protection in EU fi-
nancial system reform (DG Internal Market and Services 2010) reveals that all four key 
measures to enhance consumer protection had appeared earlier in the position papers 
published by BEUC and FIN-USE.18 Moreover, the Commission’s roadmap recognized 
17 Interview with a representative of a consumer association, Washington, DC (August 2011).
18 See, for example, online documents: BEUC “Facing Up to the Financial Crisis – BEUC’s con-
crete suggestions to protect consumers in the short and long term” (2009) and FIN-USE’s pub-
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that “consumers and other end-users of financial services need to be closely involved in 
and consulted on policy developments” in financial markets, thereby addressing the de-
mand for fairer interest representation (FIN-USE 2009a). Finally, TACD members had 
been lobbying intensively to get consumer protection into the mandate of the three au-
thorities. The European Green Party strongly supported civil society efforts, and several 
MEPs called for a strong consumer protection mandate for the new institutions.19 Civil 
action also included organizing protests against Wall Street, press conferences, demon-
strations and petitions.
These findings suggest that a network of civil society groups was a primary mover in 
generating concern about consumer protection in financial services. A closer look at 
how civil society framed the reform debate will help us understand why these lobbying 
efforts ended up influencing decision-makers after the crisis.
Symbolic politics
The financial crisis that preceded the reform debate provided a symbolic event, which 
in turn became a catalyst for policy change. Keck and Sikkink (1998: 22) coined the 
phrase “symbolic politics” to describe a strategy to create awareness by providing an 
interpretation for such an event. The crisis had generated a situation of uncertainty, and 
as a result of the shaken confidence in traditional sources of expertise, policy-makers 
turned to civil society as new source of advice as well as moral authority. When they 
advised policy-makers, civil society actors were careful to frame the issue in a way that 
linked unfair consumer practices to the collapse of the economy.20 
The argument that a lack of consumer protection led to the financial crisis and that 
greater consumer protection must be a reform priority was reoccurring in documents 
issued by members of civil society early on in the reform debate. On several occasions, 
the CU together with other groups clearly marked a lack of consumer protection as a 
root cause of the crisis – for example, in a testimony to the US House of Representatives: 
“The current crisis illustrates the high costs of a failure to provide effective consumer 
protection” (CU 2009). Similarly, for most European consumer associations and pro-
reform groups, the linkage between financial crisis and consumer protection became 
official rhetoric and campaign strategy.21 In a document published for an EU High 
Level Conference, FIN-USE (2009a) identified a “lack of consumer voice and represen-
tation” as one of the causes of the crisis. The TACD (2009b) stated: “If our governments 
lication “Summary report on EU financial markets: Putting financial users at the heart of the 
financial market reform” (2010).
19 Interview with a representative of an NGO, London (July 2011).
20 Interview with a representative of an NGO, Brussels (August 2011).
21 Interview with a representative of a consumer association, Paris (July 2011).
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had provided effective consumer protections …, much of our current economic disas-
ter could have been averted.” CI also based its G20 campaign on the premise that weak 
financial consumer protection had caused the crisis. 
The same rhetoric used by civil society was then also used by administrations in Europe 
and the US. A document released in 2010 by the US Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs (2010) identified “across-the-board failure to protect con-
sumers” as one of the root causes of the financial crisis. One can find similar wording in 
documents issued by the DG Internal Market and Services (2010: 5), basing the neces-
sity for reform on the premise that financial regulations “often disregarded consumer 
interests.” Both of these explanations, by the Senate Committee and by the Commission, 
testify to the role of civil society as an issue generator and provide evidence that civil 
society succeeded in influencing the discursive position of the US government and the 
European Commission. 
However, for leverage and symbolic politics to be successful, another essential partner 
for civil society which had to be mobilized via broad media publicity was the wider 
public. The following section will provide evidence as to how consumer groups could 
“generate information and place it where it has most influence” (Keck/Sikkink 1998: 16).
Information politics
“Information politics” refers to the capability of civil society networks to gain influ-
ence by generating politically usable information and to serve as alternate sources of 
expertise (Keck/Sikkink 1998). In the cases at hand, the transnational network tried to 
disseminate information such as statistics, reports or press releases to bring the issue 
of consumer protection onto the political agenda. The dominant tactic was to discredit 
the financial industry as a source of expertise by holding the industry’s behavior up to 
public scrutiny (“mobilization of shame”). 
Several NGOs started to systematically review the asymmetry of interest representation 
among industry and consumers in the policy process; as a result, numerous studies 
appeared which would eventually become news in major newspapers. The New York 
Times (2010) cited a report published by the Center for Responsive Politics showing 
that the financial sector’s spending on lobbying since January 2009 mounted up to $600 
billion. CNN Money released an article citing PIRG’s statistics as well as a Public Citi-
zen’s report about financial institutions hiring some 1,000 lobbyists since 2009 (Liberto 
2010). In addition, in 2009, the non-profit Wall Street Watch project attracted public 
attention with a critical report on the financial sector’s political influence called “Sold 
Out.” The non-profit public broadcasting service PBS portrayed a similar message in a 
documentary it released called “The Warning,” which was but one of a whole series on 
industry malpractices that PBS showed throughout 2009. 
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In Europe, ATTAC launched a YouTube video about malpractices in the banking sec-
tor which was viewed over 100,000 times within less than a month in 2008. NGOs 
published a number of reports – for example, on the one-sided composition of expert 
groups in favor of the financial business sector (Haar 2009) or on the political influence 
of Goldman Sachs (Spinwatch 2011). And engaging in the “shaming,” in a publicly ap-
pealing event, some NGOs awarded the “Worst Lobby Awards” to the lobby groups (i.a., 
Goldman Sachs) that had been lobbying to promote profits for the financial industry at 
the expense of the public interest. 
In order to generate politically usable information, civil society also provided stories 
told by people affected – so-called “testimony” (Keck/Sikkink 1998). By dramatizing the 
issue, NGOs create information that often has more influence on policy-makers than 
the advice of technical experts. The Consumers’ Union’s webpage, for instance, pro-
vided a forum for dialogue among citizens and consumer organizations where victims 
of abusive lending practices were invited to share their story. In a similar campaign, the 
federation of State Public Interest Research Groups submitted 160 stories to Congress 
about how the financial meltdown affected consumers. 
This combination of dramatic testimonial information along with technical and statis-
tical information generated by the various campaigns together, with personal testimony, 
publicly discredited the industry. By focusing their campaigns on the misbehavior of 
target actors, NGOs gained moral leverage over industry and policy-makers, thereby 
generating politically usable information. The next section will show that, in order to 
achieve their aims, civil society also explicitly targeted international conferences.
Boomerang politics
One way for civil society to influence policy-making on the international level is 
through coalitions with international organizations or actors, thus pressuring states 
“from above” and “from below” (Risse 2008: 265). CI, for instance, submitted their de-
mands for better consumer protection to the UN Conference on the World Financial 
Crisis that took place in New York in June 2009, and provided ongoing contributions 
to the newly set up UN Commission of Experts on Financial Reforms as well as to the 
OECD (CI 2009). Keck and Sikkink (1998: 13) famously described a “boomerang pat-
tern,” where NGOs bypass the national state and directly seek out allies to try to put 
pressure on their states from the outside. International consumer associations pursued 
a variation on the boomerang mechanism to exert pressure on relevant actors such as 
the G20 and other international organizations.
The G20 was an important site of contestation. While during the first G20 meetings 
consumer protection had largely been neglected, leaders at the Pittsburgh Summit in 
September 2009 agreed that “far more needs to be done to protect consumers;” in June 
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2010, at the G20 in Toronto, a key principle put forth was to “encourage a comprehen-
sive approach to consumer protection.” Yet, consumer protection was far from being 
regarded as a policy priority. Against this background, CI launched a global “Consum-
ers for Fair Financial Services” campaign. As part of the campaign, 30 groups signed an 
open letter to the G20 in Seoul in November 2010, calling “for the needs of everyday 
consumers of financial services to be pushed to the top of the agenda” (CI 2010). Vari-
ous NGOs started to lobby and even had face-to-face contact with important decision-
makers: for instance, German consumer associations spent one hour with Chancellor 
Merkel, and French organizations met briefly with their finance minister, Christine La-
garde. Both politicians were very receptive to the consumer groups. The French G20 
presidency had made consumer financial protection one of its priorities, and so La-
garde was particularly eager to take consumer views into account.22 Eventually, in No-
vember, the G20 published a final declaration of the Seoul Summit, saying that they had 
agreed to enhance consumer protection – to the astonishment of civil society groups.23 
In February 2011, the G20 Finance Ministers called on an OECD task force to provide 
options to enhance financial consumer protection. Initially, the OECD had no plans 
to publicly consult with civil society, and so the French finance minister’s advocacy 
turned out to be instrumental in spurring a public consultation process that included 
consumer groups. As one consumer representative reports: 
That first meeting I had with the [OECD] officials concerned, I just had a feeling that they didn’t 
regard us as very significant at all … but then, what happened was very important. I went with 
our French colleagues to see Madame Lagarde’s office. Within a couple of days, she wrote to the 
Secretary General of the OECD, saying that consumer organizations had to be involved in the 
G20 mandate. From that point the OECD started to take us very seriously indeed.24
Between April and October 2011, the task force held multiple rounds of consultations 
before a final version of the draft was agreed upon. CI, which had published a detailed 
40-page report outlining recommendations to enhance consumer protection, was in-
vited to address the panel, while at the same time, industry groups were very slow to 
react and did not even attend consultation meetings.25 In October 2011, the OECD 
published a list of non-binding cross-sectorial international standards, the “High-level 
Principles on Financial Consumer Protection,” which were subsequently endorsed by 
the G20. Members of the task force described the consultation process as consensual, “a 
collective construction, to which everyone contributed”26 and celebrated the endorse-
ment as a major improvement. 
22 Interview with a representative of an international NGO (August 2011).
23 Ibid.
24 Interview with a representative of a consumer association (August 2011).
25 Interview with an OECD official, Paris (November 2012).
26 Interview with a central banker, Paris (January 2013).
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However, besides the fact that the principles remain non-binding, the language of the 
final draft uses relatively weak wording such as “where appropriate,” “voluntary,” or “as 
appropriate.” Several of the principles were watered down. The proposal for guarantees 
on consumer deposits in banks that had appeared in an early draft was removed. Key 
factors to enhance transparency (such as the display of costs, and accurate information) 
were banned from the main text and appear only in footnotes. The creation of a new 
international organization to share best practices, an idea brought forward by CI, was 
not taken on board. “We think that sends a message about how banks have lobbied the 
committee,” notes a consumer representative. “[It’s] ‘motherhood and apple pie,’ things 
that everyone agrees on anyway. When such proposals [on consumer protection] are 
made by national governments, the banks are for them line by line; only just to do 
every thing they can to undermine it.”27 
Taken together, and despite substantial changes that were made to dilute the final draft, 
the common principles represent an unprecedented international agreement to en-
hance consumer financial protection as well as an example of how consumer associa-
tions and NGOs, in tandem with powerful policy entrepreneurs, can successfully push 
for an agenda. Most of all, in the future, the existence of an international standard will 
allow watchdog groups to refer to the G20 commitments made by heads of govern-
ments in order to put pressure on the implementation of these commitments on the 
national level.
Conclusions
Decision-makers in the US and the EU have undertaken unprecedented measures in the 
field of consumer protection as part of the financial reforms in response to the global 
financial crisis. In July 2010, the Obama administration signed the Dodd-Frank Act 
into law, thereby establishing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Simultane-
ously, the European Commission brought forward several reform proposals to improve 
consumer and investor protection. The European Parliament subsequently passed a 
resolution on basic banking services; legislation on stronger deposit guarantees and 
investor protection schemes, as well as on stricter regulations of packaged retail invest-
ment products and with responsible lending underway. Not least, decision-makers at 
the G20 agreed to international standards to enhance consumer protection on a global 
scale. Taken together, these measures mark a shift away from a focus on market effi-
ciency to a focus on consumer protection. However, a look behind the scenes of the “all 
motherhood and apple pie” rhetoric of policy-makers, industry and consumer groups 
alike reveals that the actual regulatory reform falls somewhat short of the initial pro-
reform statements. Industry groups in the EU and the US successfully diluted individ-
27 Interview with a representative of a consumer organisation (August 2011).
22 MaxPo Discussion Paper 13/2
ual measures during the implementation phase. As a result, financial consumer protec-
tion reforms across the Atlantic have not redesigned the regulatory framework, but they 
still go beyond business as usual. 
The puzzle is that this regulatory change largely runs counter to the interests of the most 
influential and resourceful actors in financial regulation: the banks and industry associ-
ations. This calls Olson’s logic of collective action into question, which departs from the 
assumptions that consumers are at a huge disadvantage in the face of well-organized 
business interests. Reform legislation after the crisis diverges from theories that explain 
regulatory policy-making by concentrated interest-group pressure or expert knowledge 
of transnational epistemic communities. Indeed, the regulatory outcome of financial 
reforms turns on its head the prevalent prediction from capture theories: that the regu-
latory outcome in international finance corresponds to the preferences of the private 
sector. In this case, policy-makers aligned with consumer associations and other civil 
society groups to bring forward a consumer-friendly agenda. 
This article identified transnational civil society groups, as non-governmental entrepre-
neurs of regulatory change. Exploiting the momentum of widespread public support 
and media attention in the aftermath of the crisis, civil society became a “catalyst for 
politicizing” (Price 1998: 639) consumer financial protection in international finance. 
The strong citizen base, in turn, allowed civil society to call upon well-positioned public 
entrepreneurs, such as parliamentarians, EU bureaucrats and key decision-makers, to 
weigh in on reform decisions. Specific policy entrepreneurs such as French finance min-
ister Lagarde, consumer advocate Warren, Commissioner Barnier and several Members 
of the European Parliament became directly involved in the reform debate and opened 
up the policy-making process to new groups. A small window of opportunity opened 
up where policy-makers turned to civil society as an alternative source of expertise. By 
reframing the reform debate, generating information and placing it strategically on the 
national and international level through direct lobbying of key actors and a variation of 
boomerang politics, the transnational network took advantage of the increased public 
attention and made consumer protection a prominent reform issue. 
This research makes several important contributions. First and foremost, it provides 
a first detailed description of the actions and campaigns by members of a civil society 
network in response to the subprime financial crisis, showing that a growing number of 
civil society organizations have developed capacities to engage in the debate on reform-
ing global finance. However, the article also highlights the limitations in civil society’s 
capacity to influence regulatory change. The findings suggest that the impact of NGO 
campaigns was largely restricted to the agenda-setting phase of the reform process. By 
contrast, the crisis-shaken private financial sector was back on its feet not long after 
the financial meltdown, increasing lobbying efforts and slowly trimming back reform 
advances, watering down consumer protection measures during reform negotiations 
in the subsequent implementation phase. Nevertheless, this analysis has provided evi-
dence that transnational NGOs are increasingly involved in standard-setting aspects of 
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financial regulation – for instance, being involved in consultation processes with the 
OECD. Furthermore, the case studies confirm the oft-argued thesis among scholars 
that the perception of a crisis is an important factor in precipitating normative change. 
The international financial crisis was important for the reform of consumer protection, 
as it demonstrated the dramatic failures of the regulatory system and mobilized public 
action and pro-change groups. The crisis, however, was the catalyst, not the cause for 
provoking policy-makers to turn to civil society as an alternative source of information 
and expertise. The article is also a contribution to the debate on how financial regula-
tion has changed post-crisis and the role of non-state actors in the ongoing contest over 
the rules governing the global political economy. This change is too recent for us to say 
with any certainty whether the new framework marks a substantial consumer-friendly 
turn in financial regulation. But the legislative action prompted by the crisis in the field 
of consumer protection remains unprecedented. This suggests that the capture model 
for explaining financial regulatory policy-making needs to be revised. 
To summarize, international financial regulation represents a particularly hard case for 
demonstrating the role of transnational civil society in global politics. In doing so, this 
article joins a number of studies that show that civil society matters in global politics: 
in the field of human rights (Keck/Sikkink 1998), security policy (Pierce 1998) or en-
vironmental protection (Florini 2000). The activism in reaction to the financial crisis 
provides another important example of the potential of civil society actors to influence 
policy outcomes on a global scale. 
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